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The Policy of Federal Student Loans: Looking 
Backward and Looking Forward 
Aaron Mohr 1 
Federal student loans are a critical linchpin of American higher 
education.
2
 Federal student loans progressed from rare and means-
tested
3
 to prevalent and universally available.
4
 Loan volume and 
amounts continue to rise in tandem with rising national higher 
education costs.
5
 Student debt is now the second largest source of 
household debt behind only home mortgages.
6
  
In the past fifty years, income for college graduates rose about 
50%,
7
 while average student loan debt rose one hundred 83% in just a 
twenty-three-year period ending in 2012.
8
 In other words, student 
debt rose three times as much as income and in half the time. The 
 
 1. Washington University School of Law, graduating May, 2017. 
 2. Roots, infra note 5, at 504 (noting student loans “brought on a deluge of federal 
intrusion into student financing of higher learning”). 
 3. Id. at 504–05. See also Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 
1219 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 4. Roots, infra note 5, at 505–06. See also Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. 
L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 448 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
 5. Palma Joy Strand, Education-As-Inheritance Crowds Out Education-As-Opportunity, 
59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 283, 295 (2015). Tuition rose an average of 4.5% above inflation at public 
higher education institutions during a ten-year period from 1998 to 2009. Id. In absolute costs, 
average tuition rose over two hundred 34% from 1980 to 1995. Roger Roots, The Student Loan 
Debt Crisis: A Lesson in Unintended Consequences, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 501, 507 (2000).  
 6. Donghoon Lee, Household Debt and Credit: Student Debt, FED. RES. BANK N.Y., at 
5–7 (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/mediaadvisory/2013/Lee022 
813.pdf.  
 7. Strand, supra note 5, at 283. This number is inflation-adjusted, real value change, 
calculated using the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics’ CPI Inflation Calculator. CPI Inflation 
Calculator, BUREAU LAB. STAT., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Jan. 20, 
2015). 
 8. Average student loans in 1989 were $8,700. Strand, supra note 5, at 295. In 2012, 
college graduates with loans averaged a $29,400 balance. Robert C. Cloud & Richard Fossey, 
Facing the Student-Debt Crisis: Restoring the Integrity of the Federal Student Loan Program, 
40 J.C. & U. LAW 467, 468 (2014). Adjusted for inflation, the 2012 value of 1989 loans is 
$16,108. CPI Inflation Calculator, supra note 7. 
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expansion of federal student loans through congressional action
9
 
coincided with a tightening of the requirements for student loan 
discharge in bankruptcy: from no additional requirements,
10
 to the 
much maligned “undue hardship” standard,11 to removing time 
limitations of collections,
12
 and finally to allowing federal benefit 
garnishment to repay student loans.
13
 The lack of a congressional 
definition of undue hardship also led to a profusion of judge-made 
law, with a consensus definition still out of reach today.
14
  
Rising student loans are a national concern because, as stated 
above, education costs—the impetus for student loans—greatly 
outpace the growth in real wages. Taken to their logical extreme, 
rising federal student loan balances will reach a point when the 
economic benefit will outweigh the cost. While college graduates 
average over $1 million more earnings throughout their careers than 
high school graduates,
15
 potential loan balances of $100,000 or more 
may be enough to deter large swaths of students from pursuing higher 
education, even though they are leaving future earnings on the 
table.
16
 If federal student loans lead to an inability or unwillingness to 
 
 9. See Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965). 
 10. See Nancy H. Kratzke, The Disparate Treatment of Student and Family Farmer 
Debtors: Suggestions for Reform of Bankruptcy Policy, N. ILL. U. L. REV. 25, 27 (1995). 
 11. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(8) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-327). 
 12. See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971(a), 112 Stat. 
1837 (1998).  
 13. See Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 
(1996) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3716(c)(3)(A)(i) (2012)).  
 14. Cloud & Fossey, supra note 8, at 475–76. See also Robert C. Cloud, When Does 
Repaying a Student Loan Become an Undue Hardship?, 185 EDUC. L. REP. 783, 784–85 
(2004).  
 15. Jennifer C. Day & Eric C. Newburger, The Big Payoff: Educational Attainment and 
Synthetic Estimates of Work-Life Earnings, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, at 3–4 (2002), 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p23-210.pdf. 
 16. The wealth gap between high school and college graduate accumulates most during 
peak earning years: during the late-career stage. Id. at 4 (disparate earning trajectories, i.e., 
salary divergence over time, accounts for some of the lifetime earning disparity). Entry-level 
wage differences are less pronounced across education levels. Heidi Shierholz et al., The Class 
of 2014: The Weak Economy Is Idling Too Many Young Graduates, ECON. POL’Y INST., at 18 
(2014), http://www.epi.org/files/2014/Classof2014FINAL.pdf (citing data that new high school 
graduates from age seventeen to twenty made around $20,400, while college graduates from 
age twenty-one to twenty-four made approximately $35,300, in 2014). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/26
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pursue degrees, America fails in its core democratic value of equal 
opportunity education—the very impetus for expanding loans.17  
Solving the issue of rising student loan balances first requires an 
examination of possible causes. Some scholars suggest that the very 
existence of loan programs leads to increasing demand and ultimately 
continued expansion of the loans available to be borrowed.
18
 Since 
federal student loans fund higher education, and higher education 
costs have increased dramatically,
19
 many posit increasing tuition is 
driving loan increases.
20
 Finally, other academics suggest that the 
great difficulty in discharging loans in bankruptcy prevents 
hopelessly uncollectible debts from being purged from the program, 
in turn raising the national aggregate loan balance higher.
21
  
The proposal suggested in this Note attempts to hone in on the 
root cause of loan increases: higher education costs. Loans do not 
exist without a reason to borrow. While restructuring loans and 
loosening bankruptcy standards may alter loan balances, they are 
more akin to treating symptoms than treating the underlying disease. 
Federal student loans exist to pay tuition and other expenses, so it 
follows a permanent solution must address, on some level, the costs 
for which we borrow. This Note proposes setting maximum loan 
amounts to the seventy-fifth percentile of college costs in the U.S. 
This formula would not permit annual allowable growth, though it 
would adjust with inflation. Exceptions could be made for schools 
that prove exceptional value. 
Part I of this Note outlines the history of federal student loan 
programs, the development of bankruptcy law to complement loan 
programs, and the emerging student loan crisis. Part II analyzes the 
most pertinent factors influencing loans and existing proposals to 
 
 17. H.R. Rep. 102-447, at 7 (1992). Id. (discussing the national goal of equal education). 
 18. See, e.g., Roots, supra note 5, at 504–05. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 507. 
 21. Id. at 515. A sub-theory of this cause posits that many debtors with meritorious claims 
for discharge of their student loans do not attempt to discharge them because of the expense of 
the separate bankruptcy hearing required for adjudication. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, 
The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
179, 190–91 (2009). Additionally, these hearings are fraught with uncertainty due to the lack of 
a consensus definition of undue hardship. Id. 
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alter the student loan landscape. Part III proposes a new solution to 
improve the long-term viability of the federal student loan programs. 
I. HISTORY 
The transformation of federal student loans from a minor federal 
program to a ubiquitous part of higher education began in 1958 with 
the National Defense Education Act.
22
 This investment in education 
during the height of the space race was at least in part to encourage 
Americans to pursue science and mathematics and thereby counter 
Russian advances during the ongoing Cold War.
23
 Given the success 
of these initial federal loans, the 1965 Higher Education Act included 
an expanded Guaranteed Student Loan Program.
24
 These loans, the 
inception of Stafford Loans,
25
 were available to the poorest students 
who needed outside financing to afford higher education.
26
  
With college costs rising
27
 and loan financing unavailable to most 
middle-class families,
28
 the political climate aligned for yet another 
expansion of federal student loans.
29
 The Middle-Income Student 
Assistance Act of 1978 followed.
30
 This Act worked within the 
existing federal framework of the Stafford Loan program (and minor 
 
 22. National Defense Education Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 (1958) 
(repealed 1970). The 1958 Act’s authorized annual loans totaled $47.5 million. Id. In recent 
years, outstanding federal student loans exceeded $1 Trillion. Rohit Chopra, A Closer Look at 
the Trillion, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
blog/a-closer-look-at-the-trillion/. 
 23. Michael Simkovic, Risk-Based Student Loans, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 549–50 
(2013). 
 24. Cloud & Fossey, supra note 8, at 473. See generally Higher Education Act of 1965, 
Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965) (codified throughout sections 20 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 25. Cloud & Fossey, supra note 8, at 473. 
 26. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232 (1965). This 
requirement by Congress was eventually codified as disallowing grants to those with a family 
income exceeding $25,000. 20 U.S.C. § 1078(A)(2)(B) & (D) (1976).  
 27. H.R. REP. NO. 95-951, at 2 (1978). 
 28. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 29. Cloud & Fossey, supra note 8, at 473. 
 30. Middle-Income Student Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-566, 92 Stat. 2402 (1978). It 
provided for “financial assistance to millions of middle-income students who are now ineligible 
for most financial aid programs. In accomplishing this objective the level of federal assistance 
to students from low-income families is not reduced. It is, in fact, also increased.” H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-951, at 3 (1978). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/26
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grant programs) to provide up to $4.7 billion in loans in 1979 alone.
31
 
The effect was immediate: within three years, federal student loans 
tripled.
32
 The periodic expansion continued again with the Higher 
Education Amendments of 1992.
33
 These Amendments were part of 
the frequent reauthorizations of the Higher Education Act, but in 
1992 also included new loan programs: the umbrella Federal Family 
Education Loan Program,
34
 Family PLUS Loans,
35
 Federal Direct 
Loans,
36
 and Federal Perkins Loans.
37
  
Student loans and their increasing availability marked a gradual 
but fundamental shift in federal education funding.
38
 In 1965, the 
landmark Higher Education Act appropriated 68% of its funds to 
institutional aid for expenses like physical improvements, and only 
32% to student aid.
39
 By 1992, the Higher Education Amendments to 
the Act funneled 97% of appropriations to student aid.
40
 Despite this 
shift, an enduring goal remained: equal opportunity to attain higher 
education.
41
 
Institutional aid, student grants, and student loans all promote this 
goal, however, student loans present a distinct quid pro quo: in 
exchange for opportunity, students promise to tap into their future 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. MICHAEL MUMPER, REMOVING COLLEGE PRICE BARRIERS: WHAT GOVERNMENT 
HAS DONE AND WHY IT DOESN’T WORK 90 (1996). 
 33. Higher Education Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-325, 106 Stat. 448 (1992). 
 34. Id. at § 411–32. 
 35. Id. at § 418. This expansion allowed “parents of a dependent student” to enroll in 
(graduate) PLUS loans, thereby expanding education loans beyond individuals directly enrolled 
in higher education. Id. 
 36. Id. at § 451. This is the William D. Ford Program. See generally Direct Loans: The 
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.., http://www2.ed.gov/ 
offices/OSFAP/DirectLoan/index.html. 
 37. Id. at § 461–68; Cloud & Fossey, supra note 8, at 474. See generally Perkins Loans, 
U.S. DEPT’ OF EDUC., https://studentaid.ed.gov/sa/types/loans/perkins. 
 38. Congress noted in 1992, the Higher Education Act transmuted, “from an Act which 
primarily supported higher education through the purchase of things, such as buildings and 
books,” into “primarily . . . student aid programs.” H.R. REP. NO. 102-447, at 7 (1992).  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 8. 
 41. Id. at 7. Equal opportunity in education was heralded long before federal student loans 
were proposed. Id. President Truman, through his Commission on Higher Education, President 
Eisenhower, through his Committee on Education Beyond the High School, President Johnson, 
and President Nixon all expressed an important interest in higher education opportunity. Id.  
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success and repay the government and taxpayers.
42
 To implement this 
reciprocity and to prevent abuse, federal student loans are easily 
obtained
43
 and contain advantageous terms,
44
 but are exceedingly 
difficult to discharge in bankruptcy.
45
 The first Higher Education Act 
in 1965 did not have a higher standard for discharge of student loans 
in bankruptcy than was ordinary for other debts in such 
proceedings.
46
 By the 1970s, however, Congress became worried 
students were cheating the system by declaring bankruptcy before 
beginning work, thereby eliminating or reducing federal loan 
repayments.
47
 To combat this, an undue hardship standard
48
 was 
included in the Education Amendments of 1976.
49
 Despite continuing 
debate in Congress of whether educational debt should be treated 
differently than other debt,
50
 the undue hardship standard (when 
discharging federal student loans five years or less after repayment 
begins)
51
 was retained in the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act.
52
 The 
1978 Act took the 1976 reforms and codified them directly into the 
Bankruptcy Code.
53
 Congress acted again in 1990
54
 and 1998,
55
 first 
 
 42. Cloud & Fossey, supra note 8, at 475. 
 43. Robert C. Cloud, Offsetting Social Security Benefits to Repay Student Loans: Pay Us 
Now or Pay Us Later, 208 EDUC. L. REP. 11, 21 (2006). 
 44. Federal student loans do not require a co-signor, have relatively low interest rates, 
contain hardship deferment possibilities, and can be eligible for income-based repayment 
schemes. Cloud & Fossey, supra note 8, at 474–75.  
 45. U.S. Bankruptcy Code requires a debtor to demonstrate “undue hardship” before 
student loans may be discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(8) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-327). 
Lacking a legislated definition of undue hardship, courts have generally defined this term as a 
high bar for discharge, ranging from “certainty of hopelessness,” to something more than 
passing financial instability, even if severe. Cloud, supra note 14, at 784–85.  
 46. Nancy H. Kratzke & Thomas O. Depperschmidt, The Disparate Treatment of Student 
and Family Farmer Debtors: Suggestions for Reform of Bankruptcy Policy, 16 N. ILL. U. L. 
REV. 25, 27 (1995). 
 47. In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d 737, 742 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 48. “[S]uch loan may be released only if the court in which the proceeding is pending 
determines that payment from future income of other wealth will impose an undue hardship on 
the debtor or his dependents[.]” The Educational Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, tit. 
I § 127(a), 90 Stat. 2081, 2141 (1976) (emphasis added) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1087-3) 
(repealed 1978). This undue hardship provision lives on in the present-day U.S. Bankruptcy 
Code. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
 49. Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232 (1965). 
 50. In re Pelkowski, 990 F.2d at 742. 
 51. Higher Education Act of 1965. 
 52. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (1978). 
 53. Id. (codified throughout sections 11 and 20 of the U.S. Code). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/26
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increasing the undue hardship standard limit to seven years, and then 
eliminating the time limitation altogether.
56
 Undue hardship remains, 
to this day, the standard to discharge federal student loans in 
bankruptcy.
57
 
With the undue hardship standard firmly entrenched for federal 
student loans in bankruptcy proceedings, Congress extended this 
approach to private student loans in 2005.
58
 Later in 2007, Congress 
added a few alternatives to full student loan debt repayment with the 
College Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRAA),
59
 including 
income-based repayment
60
 and even loan forgiveness,
61 
but these 
alternatives were supplementary, not replacements for traditional 
student debt with its difficult discharge requirements.  
Except for the recent alternatives, public and private student loan 
relief relies on discharge via the undue hardship standard written into 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
62
 While 
continued emphasis on undue hardship ought to compel clear 
 
 54. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 3621(1), 104 Stat 4789, 4964 
(1990). 
 55. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, § 971(a), 112 Stat. 
1837 (1998). 
 56. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-327). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
8, § 220, 119 Stat. 23, 59 (2005) (amending 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) to include: “any other 
educational loan that is a qualified education loan, as defined in section 221(d)(1) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986”). 
 59. College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-84, 121 Stat. 784 
(2007). 
 60. The CCRAA amended the income-contingent repayment plan to make it available for 
more types of loans and capped loan payments at 15% of a borrower’s adjusted gross income. 
H.R. REP. 110-210. 
 61. The committee that drafted the bill took a tailored approach to loan forgiveness (as 
opposed to the wide availability of loans generally) by limiting it to public service workers. Id. 
“These targeted professions include: first responders, law enforcement officers, firefighters, 
nurses, public defenders, prosecutors, early childhood educators, librarians, and other public 
sector employees.” Id. The generosity of partial or complete loan forgiveness for these public 
sector employees is an attempt to spur students into careers of national need. Id. Where student 
loans were once directed to boost America’s performance in the science and technology-laden 
space race, today we see emerging federal education incentives directed toward contemporary 
areas of need. Specifically, $1,000 is forgiven for each year served in designated jobs, up to 
$5,000 total, and/or total Direct Loan forgiveness is available for “public sector employees” 
after ten years on the job. Id. 
 62. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). 
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definitions for this legal term of art, “undue hardship” was statutorily 
undefined in the Education Amendments of 1976
63
 and remained 
undefined the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
64
  
In the absence of a legislated definition of undue hardship, courts 
imbue the term with what some scholars believe are unreasonably 
difficult conditions for discharging student loan debt in bankruptcy.
65
 
Four main tests have emerged from the federal circuit and district 
courts for determining undue hardship: the Johnson test,
66
 the totality 
of circumstances test,
67
 the Brunner test,
68
 and the Bryant poverty 
test.
69
 The Brunner test is the most widely embraced of the four;
70
 the 
Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits adopted it directly, while the Fifth, 
Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh use it to varying degrees.
71
 The three-part 
Brunner test is: 
(1) [T]hat the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income 
and expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for herself and 
her dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) that additional 
circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely 
 
 63. Educational Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-482, tit. I § 127(a), 90 Stat. 2081, 
2141 (1976). 
 64. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (1978). 
 65. Richard Fossey, The Certainty of Hopelessness: Are Courts Too Harsh Toward 
Bankrupt Student Loan Debtors?, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 29, 29, 48 (1997). 
 66. In re Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532, 59–60 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979) (applying a three-
contingent-part mechanical, good faith, and policy test). At its most basic, the test asks: will the 
debtor be able to repay the loan when balanced with living expenses? Was the debtor negligent 
or irresponsible with financial planning? If yes, would a theoretical lack of negligence or 
irresponsibility alter the first (mechanical) question? Finally, is it clear the debtor is undergoing 
bankruptcy proceedings solely to discharge student loan debt or has the debtor clearly 
benefitted from the education? Id. 
 67. Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp., 661 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(vacating and remanding for further fact-finding). 
 68. In re Brunner, 46 B.R. 752, 756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd sub nom. Brunner v. 
N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987) (per curiam). 
 69. Bryant v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 72 B.R. 913, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1987) (proposing a test “to analyze the income and resources of the debtor and his dependents 
in relation to federal poverty guidelines”). The district court stated the easy application, definite 
objectivity, and use of an existing federal benchmark would eliminate the need for complex 
totality-of-circumstances analyses in all but the most unusual scenarios. Id. at 915–18. The 
district court felt judges should avoid moral adjudication on others’ finances whenever possible. 
Id. at 918.  
 70. Cloud & Fossey, supra note 8, at 479. 
 71. Id. 
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to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of 
the student loans; and (3) that the debtor has made good faith 
efforts to repay the loans.
72
 
As if the underlying complexity of the doctrine were not enough, 
undue hardship discharge determinations also must be filed as an 
adversary proceeding—effectively a small-scale litigation within the 
ongoing bankruptcy proceeding.
73
 This is an expensive proceeding 
with a high risk of losing.
74
 The irony of the discharge procedure is 
that those suffering legitimate undue hardship are the least likely to 
be able to afford adequate representation necessary for success in 
adversarial litigation contexts.
75
  
For better or worse, federal student loans have become an integral 
part of the United States’ educational system, with over two-thirds of 
higher education enrollees depending on loans to pay for some 
portion of their education.
76
 In recent years, the numbers of student 
borrowers, the size of loans, and the respective portion of household 
debt, have all risen precipitously.
77
 From 2004 to 2012, outstanding 
loans increased nearly three-fold to reach $966 billion,
78
 with a 70% 
escalation in the number of loans over the same time period.
79
 
Presently, federal student loans exceed $1 trillion.
80
 Scholars 
postulate many different reasons
81
 for the recent loan surge, including 
 
 72. Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396.  
 73. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(6); Pardo & Lacey, supra note 21, at 188. 
 74. NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 212 (1997), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/07consum.pdf. 
 75. Id. at 211–12. 
 76. Jeffrey J. Williams, Academic Freedom and Indentured Students: Escalating Student 
Debt is a Kind of Bondage, 98 ACAD. 12 (2012). See also Inst. for College Access & Success, 
Student Debt and the Class of 2013, at 1 (Nov. 2014), http://ticas.org/sites/default/ 
files/legacy/fckfiles/pub/classof2013.pdf (69% of 2013 college graduates had student loan debt, 
averaging $28,400). 
 77. Lee, supra note 6, at 7 (since 2008, student loans have surpassed home equity lines of 
credit, auto loans, and credit as a leading share of American debt second only to home 
mortgages).  
 78. Id. at 9. This number continues to rise. Chopra, supra note 22. 
 79. Lee, supra note 6, at 9.  
 80. U.S. Gov. Accountability Office, Federal Student Loans: Education Could Do More 
to Help Ensure Borrowers Are Aware of Repayment and Forgiveness Options, at 1 (Aug. 
2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672136.pdf. 
 81. Id. Lee suggests increases in higher education matriculants, parental loans on behalf of 
students, longer time-to-completion of programs, common deferment of payments, and the 
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after-effects of the 2008–09 economic recession.82 It is unclear what 
ultimate repercussions will result from America’s continued and 
increased reliance on student loans. Emerging trends, however, are 
not positive: as loans surge, so does the percentage of debtors behind 
on payments.
83
 Further, when examining only loans ripe for 
repayment, i.e., excluding loans not yet due, over 30% of loans are 
delinquent.
84
 The historic discharge rate for federal student loans is 
quite low,
85
 but if 30% of borrowers are genuinely unable to repay,
86
 
this may increase discharge rates causing billions of dollars in losses 
to the programs.
87
  
II. ANALYSIS 
A. Undue Hardship 
Scholars often critique federal student loans because section 
523(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code—the undue hardship standard for 
discharge
88—creates uncertainty89 and generally sets such a high bar 
that it deters those facing genuine hardship from requesting 
discharge.
90
 Despite frequent criticism and a lack of evidence of 
 
inability to discharge all contributed to the rise of student loan debt in the 2000s. Lee, supra 
note 6. 
 82. Recession-based effects may include unemployed individuals unable to make loan 
payments and students postponing entering the job market, instead attending more advanced 
school and acquiring additional loan debt. Cloud & Fossey, supra note 8, at 469, 493.  
 83. Lee, supra note 6, at 11 (summarizing 2004–12 data showing student loan 
delinquency—ninety days late—increasing across all age group from less than 10% to 17%).  
 84. Id. at 15. Additionally, as of September 2014, an estimated $103 billion of over $1 
trillion debt was in default. Federal Student Loans, supra note 80, at 1.  
 85. Janet Kosol, Running the Gauntlet of “Undue Hardship”—The Discharge of Student 
Loans in Bankruptcy, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 457, 462 (1981).  
 86. Lee, supra note 77 at 15. To be clear, Lee’s presentation does not suggest 30% of loan 
holders would rise to the level of undue hardship, as required for bankruptcy discharge. In fact, 
the challenging undue hardship standard is a major hurdle. Fossey, supra note 65, at 34 
(discussing the difficulty of the standard). 
 87. Cloud & Fossey, supra note 8, at 468 (noting approximately $1.2 trillion of 
outstanding federal student loan debt; a 30% discharge in bankruptcy proceedings would 
therefore represent $300 billion). 
 88. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2012). 
 89. See supra note 45. 
 90. Pardo, supra note 21, at 190–91. 
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student loan abuse, the standard persists.
91
 Academics and scholars 
nearly all support abolishing the undue hardship standard.
92
 Given 
that discharge rates are currently low, however, this change would 
impact only a small portion of loans—those owed by debtors entering 
bankruptcy—leaving most debtors unaffected.93 If loan discharge 
became more commonplace, however, debtors would default en 
masse and federal taxpayers would bear education costs. Fear of this 
sort of loan program collapse led to the initial undue hardship 
standard and its subsequent expansions.
94
  
B. Education Cost 
The next two issues weighing on student loans, higher education 
cost and loan availability, present a chicken-and-egg style dilemma 
because they appear intractably intertwined. Does increasing higher 
education cost lead to escalating loan usage, or does loan access drive 
up tuition and associated spending? Colleges and universities have 
lined up largely in support of the former assertion
95
 while many other 
 
 91. Kosol, supra note 85, at 462 ($17 million was discharged from 1969 to 1975, which 
was a minute fraction of the total $7 billion outstanding at the time). 
 92. See, e.g., Pardo, supra note 21, at 235; Cloud & Fossey, supra note 8, at 497. 
 93. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 21, at 181. A recent General Accounting Office study 
established that the discharge rate was less than 1% of all federal loans issued. Id. 
 94. Cloud & Fossey, supra note 8, at 477–78 (describing the impression in Congress that 
student loan holders might attempt to defraud taxpayers through loan discharge). 
 95. Colleges suggest several reasons, exclusive of loan availability, why tuition has 
increased dramatically, including: “new demands by parents and students for computers and 
other expensive amenities, increased competition for a shrinking pool of college-age students, 
expanded efforts to diversify the student body, higher financial-aid costs borne by colleges and 
universities, heightened competition for quality faculty,” necessary systems upgrades, and a 
perception that price is directly proportional with quality. R. Paul Guerre, Financial Aid in 
Higher Education: What's Wrong, Who's Being Hurt, What's Being Done, 17 J.C. & U.L. 483, 
486–87 (1991). Governmental changes, including reduced public education funding and tax 
code changes (diminishing charitable giving), may also increase funding reliance on tuition 
revenues. Id. at 488. Other scholars use an economic framework to explain that tuition is not 
driven by loans: they say the market for education is inelastic because increasing numbers of 
people are going to college while the spots at the best and most expensive schools have not 
increased, keeping demand constant and incentivizing schools to raise prices. William S. 
Howard, The Student Loan Crisis and the Race to Princeton Law School, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 
485, 496–97 (2011). Furthermore, scholars indicate inelasticity exists because education is a 
luxury good, institutions are driven to improve national rankings by spending money on ranking 
factors, the education sector is not a free market because of heavy regulation, for example, 
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observers point to the latter.
96
 Both sides acknowledge inelastic 
education demand, i.e., students attending regardless of cost, but 
draw different conclusions about why it exists.
97
 The case for 
examining higher education as a luxury good
98
 and thereby tuition 
driving loans is particularly compelling. The most expensive and 
prestigious schools derive value by providing social status, excellent 
career opportunities, and significant networking.
99
 To maintain their 
effectiveness as opportunity generators, they must remain exclusive 
(largely to attract lucrative employers), and exclusivity ensures 
consistent, unwavering demand regardless of price.
100
 Where race, 
gender, or last name once served a gatekeeping function into the 
highest ranks of society, now a handful of exclusive degrees from 
America’s best institutions serve the same purpose.101 The 
tremendous social and personal advantages conferred by such degrees 
make them luxury goods with virtually no limit to what they charge 
students.
102
 Federal research tentatively points in the other 
direction—to loan availability as spurring higher tuition.103 One 
 
accreditation and statutory requirements, and admission of previously marginalized classes of 
people in unprecedented numbers. Id. at 497.  
 96. One economic interpretation implies inelastic education demand (and the resulting 
price insensitivity) results from delayed payment for education thanks to loans. Roots, supra 
note 5, at 505–06. As a result, colleges raise prices because they are able to do so without 
dampening attendance. Id. Additionally, while colleges avoid framing tuition increases as a 
consequence of loan availability, one college leader directly told a congressional committee 
federal loans led to growing tuition. Id. at 507–08. Anecdotally, “[i]n the 1990's, when 
Republicans in Congress threatened to enact tuition cost controls if schools did not rein in costs, 
tuitions immediately began to rise more moderately.” Id. A congressional threat to loans and 
subsequent moderation of tuition ostensibly demonstrates that loans drive tuition and not vice 
versa. Further, although some argue decreased state funding led to more loan-funded tuition, 
one scholar asserts state de-funding of education occurred because states saw federal student 
loans as a method to off-board state expenses. Id. at 505. 
 97. See supra notes 95–96.  
 98. Howard, supra note 95, at 497–98. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 498–99. 
 101. Id. at 498. 
 102. Id. at 497–98. Ironically, the most prestigious institutions, for example Harvard, 
charge some of the highest tuitions despite having large endowments and a great ability to 
leverage institutional resources to reduce student expenses. See generally Harvard at a Glance, 
HARV. U., http://www.harvard.edu/about-harvard/harvard-glance (last visited Nov. 17, 2016) 
(total undergraduate cost of $63,025 for 2016–17, an endowment of $37.6 billion in 2015, and 
over 55% of undergraduates receive scholarships averaging $50,000). 
 103. The Congressional Research Service conducted a literature review but said it could 
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federal agency found increases in federal student aid precipitated 
increases in tuition by schools relying most on this aid for revenue,
104
 
while another study by a different agency was inconclusive.
105
  
Regardless of whether tuition growth propels federal student loan 
growth or the converse is true, the interrelatedness yields many 
solutions attacking one variable to limit the other. Some directly 
regulate tuition, including: paying for public education,
106
 capping 
tuition,
107
 imposing progressive tuition rates,
108
 and creating a public 
school pre-paid model.
109
 Paying for public education presents 
several challenges: by implication it excludes funding private 
schools, it is costly to undertake,
110
 and it would be difficult to 
prevent states from decreasing their own funding of higher education, 
as allegedly occurred in response to past increases in federal loans.
111
 
Further, the administration of free public education would be 
inequitable across the country, as differing states fund their higher 
 
not reach a definite conclusion on the relationship of federal funding and tuition prices, though 
it did not rule out a possible causal connection. ADAM STOLL ET AL., OVERVIEW OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FEDERAL STUDENT AID AND INCREASES IN COLLEGE PRICES (Cong. 
Research Serv., 2014), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.ncher.us/resource/collection/1CFB07FA-
74C6-4F0A-8E79-3ADB2C453546/R43692.pdf. Another recent report by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York “used a Bartik-like approach to identify the effect of increased loan supply 
on tuition following large policy changes between 2008 and 2010 in the maximum federal aid 
amounts available to undergraduate students.” DAVID O. LUCCA ET AL., CREDIT SUPPLY AND 
THE RISE IN COLLEGE TUITION: EVIDENCE FROM THE EXPANSION IN FEDERAL STUDENT AID 
PROGRAMS 26 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. ed., 2015), https://www.newyorkfed.org/ 
medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr733.pdf. They found that schools most affected by 
policy changes increased aid at the same time they raised their tuition more than would be 
expected. Id.  
 104. Id. 
 105. STOLL, supra note 103. 
 106. Notably and most recently, presidential candidate Hillary Clinton proposed a $350 
billion plan to make public higher education tuition free for all students. The New College 
Compact, HILLARY FOR AM. (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.hillaryclinton.com/p/briefing/ 
factsheets/2015/08/10/college-compact-debt/. 
 107. Howard, supra note 95, at 508 (exploring several proposed or enacted state tuition 
caps).  
 108. Implementing progressive tuition means the amount of tuition charged would vary 
based on socioeconomic health of the student and his or her family. Id. at 509. For instance, 
students might be expected to pay 15% of their family’s income; this would be $15,000 for a 
family making $100,000 or $150,000 for a family making $1 million. Id.  
 109. See infra notes 114–116 and accompanying text (defining and discussing the public 
school pre-paid model). 
 110. See The New College Compact, supra note 106. 
 111. See Roots, supra note 5, at 505. 
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education systems at different rates, charge different amounts of 
tuition, and are not of uniform academic quality. Capping tuition 
would also be difficult because it is not clear if the federal 
government has the power to cap tuition unilaterally.
112
 Even if 
capping tuition among public schools were feasible, this would not 
extend to private institutions, which provide about one quarter of all 
higher education.
113
 Several states created a feasible pre-paid 
model,
114
 whereby patents contribute to a state investment program to 
grow contributions for future use at a public school.
115
 Pre-paid 
programs, however, most advantage middle-class families who have 
the knowledge, foresight, and income to join the program far in 
advance of a child going to college.
116
 Pre-paid programs do little to 
help low-income students who lack awareness and the financial 
ability to reduce their future loan debt.  
C. Education Financing 
Instead of modifying tuition, altering the structure of loans would 
directly impact loans themselves and could act as a check on 
education costs. Proposals range from modest limits on loan interest 
rates
117
 to extreme abolition of federal loans altogether.
118
 Logically, 
limiting interest, and thereby reducing (the interest portion of) loan 
payments, does not provide any meaningful check on the education 
 
 112. Strand, supra note 5, at 300 (public education is within the purview of the states, not 
the federal government). 
 113. Lynn O’Shaughnessy, 20 Surprising Higher Education Facts, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP. (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/the-college-solution/2011/09/ 
06/20-surprising-higher-education-facts. Seventy-three percent of college students attend public 
schools. Id. Assuming, arguendo, that state-established public education belongs to states, not 
the federal government, then neither controls private education, at least as they relate to tuition 
caps. Note 112. For an exploration of federal and state powers impacting private institutions of 
higher education, see generally Philip J. Faccenda & Kathleen Ross, Constitutional and 
Statutory Regulation of Private Colleges and Universities, 9 VAL. U. L. REV. 539 (1975). 
 114. Guerre, supra note 95, at 524.  
 115. Id. at 524–28. 
 116. Id. at 524. 
 117. The New College Compact, supra note 106 (proposing to “[s]ignificantly cut the 
interest rate on student loans”). 
 118. Ben Barrett et al., Starting From Scratch, NEW AM. (Feb. 2016), https://static. 
newamerica.org/attachments/12616--463/Starting-From-Scratch.78d72818d45e4cf18327b0ff 
2bd8f85b.pdf. 
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system that perpetuates rising loan balances because it does not 
directly affect tuition. One positive aspect of lowering interest rates is 
that it is politically feasible, evidenced by regular lowering in the 
past; rates ebb and flow depending on the political climate of any 
given Congress.
119
  
Completely eliminating loans would certainly get the attention of 
stakeholders who control tuition, but might fall short of the American 
ideal of equal access to higher education. It is unclear what 
mechanisms, if any, would exist in place of federal loans to finance 
college expenses. Opportunistic predatory lenders might fill the 
lending space, preying on vulnerable, unsophisticated students. Then 
again, if this reform were coupled with loosening of bankruptcy 
standards, students who were taken advantage of could escape from 
predatory loans, leading to self-policing by the industry to preserve 
their business. This is but one imagined scenario in the absence of 
federal student loans. 
Colleges and universities faced with the loss of billions of dollars 
of federal student loan money could tighten budgets dramatically—to 
reduce tuition—or find alternate sources of funding. Schools with 
great fundraising power and large endowments could tap these 
resources, while others could solicit local businesses to defray 
education costs in exchange for closely aligning student 
competencies with those businesses’ workforce needs. Student 
amenities, such as climbing walls, bowling alleys, free music 
concerts, and frequently remodeled dormitories, might disappear as 
colleges focus on their core mission: educating students in the 
classroom. Schools might enter the student loan market, originating 
loans themselves. Lending by colleges, were it ever to occur, would 
pressure the institutions to produce graduates capable of paying 
student loans because graduates incapable of repaying their loans 
would thereby reduce the school’s revenue (from payments on loans). 
This is an incentive colleges do not currently have because the 
federal government is the lender and thus bears the cost when loans 
go unpaid. Arguendo, schools with high fixed costs, little cash flow, 
and high defaults on their self-originated student loans would not 
 
 119. Historical Interest Rates, FINAID, http://www.finaid.org/loans/historicalrates.phtml 
(demonstrating multitudinous interest rate changes over nearly two decades). 
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survive in a system without federal loans. Ostensibly, the education 
market would stabilize as adaptive schools would persist and take the 
place of perished schools unable to endure without federal student 
loans.  
Complete elimination of student lending is fraught with issues, 
despite its potential benefits. Chiefly, it may run counter to the 
American ideal of equal opportunity education.
120
 Tuition and other 
costs may remain high, and without publicly available loans the poor 
and disadvantaged may be priced out of higher education. Similarly, 
alternative funding sources may not appear, or may not be abundant 
enough to offset the loss of federal loans, reducing access to 
education. Additionally, due to cost constraints, the education market 
may shrink too much, reducing our national capacity to educate 
students desirous of the improved lifetime earnings and other benefits 
of education. Instead of improving educational opportunity, complete 
removal of federal student loans could potentially decrease access to 
higher education by reducing supply. 
III. PROPOSAL 
A reasoned middle ground between the narrowness of interest rate 
reductions and the austerity of loan elimination seems the best path 
forward. I propose limiting federal student loan borrowing to the 
seventy-fifth percentile of national average college costs.
121
 Schools 
wanting students to borrow more than this amount in loans would 
need to petition the federal government and prove that their 
institution provides “exceptional value” through employment 
statistics, high admissions to graduate school, or some other clearly 
quantifiable metric. The seventy-fifth percentile benchmark would 
not have any allowable annual growth, but it would automatically 
adjust upward for inflation. The same concept could easily be applied 
to graduate and professional school loans.  
 
 120. H.R. REP. 102-447, at 7 (1992). 
 121. In practice, there would be several different seventy-fifth percentiles grouped by 
similarly situated programs. Each percentile would be determined by comparing costs amongst 
higher education degrees of similar duration, accreditation, and scope. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol53/iss1/26
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017]  The Policy of Federal Student Loans 357 
 
 
This plan strikes the right balance on several accounts. First, its 
present-day impact on schools is relatively minimal. By definition, 
75% of schools would have students who could borrow the maximum 
cost of their education from the federal government. The schools in 
the upper 25%, which—beyond being expensive—are largely 
prestigious, have endowments, wealthy donors, and histories of 
generous private need-based grants. Prestige and its accompanying 
resources usually beget high employment and other characteristics 
that might demonstrate “exceptional value.”122 Further, with strong 
financial resources they can replace lost loans with other funds. A 
funding shift may be wholly unnecessary, however, because 
prestigious schools already provide many grants to poor entrants,
123
 
and the wealthier matriculants are unlikely to utilize any loans.  
Favorably, the seventy-fifth percentile cut-off would disadvantage 
high-priced schools lacking “exceptional value,” for example, many 
private, for-profit schools. Private, for-profit colleges are the 
scourges of higher education because of poor unemployment 
outcomes
124
 and extremely high student loan default rates.
125
 For-
profits’ tuition costs also run significantly higher than other 
undergraduate tuition costs—nearly five times the cost of two-year 
 
 122. For example, at Harvard, an undeniably prestigious yet expensive school, class of 
2016 employed graduates reported salaries with a median range of $70,000 to $89,000. 
Cordelia F. Mendez, The Graduating Class of 2016 by the Numbers: Post-Harvard Plans, 
HARV. CRIMSON, http://features.thecrimson.com/2016/senior-survey/post-harvard-narrative/ 
(last visited Nov. 18, 2016). Using the midpoint of the range, $79,500, as a point of 
comparison, Harvard graduates’ starting salaries are approximately 57% higher than the 
national average starting salary for class of 2016 college graduates, $50,556. Susie Poppick, 
Here’s What the Average Grad Makes Right Out of College, MONEY (Apr. 22, 2015), 
http://time.com/money/3829776/heres-what-the-average-grad-makes-right-out-of-college/. 
 123. Ivy League and peer schools often claim to meet all of a student’s financial needs 
through grants. See, e.g., How Aid Works, HARV. C. GRIFFIN FIN. AID OFF., https://college 
.harvard.edu/financial-aid/how-aid-works. 
 124. Susannah Snider, 3 Must-Know Facts About For-Profit Colleges, Student Debt, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct. 1, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/ 
education/best-colleges/paying-for-college/articles/2014/10/01/3-facts-for-students-to-know-
about-for-profit-colleges-and-student-debt. 
 125. Inst. for College Access & Success, Despite Lower Rates More Than 650,000 
Defaulted on Federal Student Loans (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.ticas.org/sites/default/ 
files/legacy/pub_files/CDR_2014_NR.pdf (noting for-profit student loan default rates about 
four times as high as community colleges and three times as high as public four-year schools).  
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public colleges and over 50% more than four-year public colleges.
126
 
Tamping down students’ ability to borrow to attend for-profits could 
lead to a decline in the industry or to a renewed focus by for-profits 
to provide lower-cost, higher-quality education.  
The biggest benefit of this approach may not be immediate. 
Admittedly, a seventy-fifth percentile cap on costs would at first 
affect 25% of schools, and even fewer when accounting for schools 
where borrowers are not taking maximum loans. However, limiting 
education expense growth only to inflation reins in all future cost 
increases. Whereas current loan amounts are virtually unlimited, the 
seventy-fifth percentile benchmark would prevent loan borrowing 
from outpacing inflation. This would be a warning to high-cost 
schools that students may follow full-expense-coverage loans to 
cheaper schools if they do not tamp down costs. Notably, schools 
retain complete autonomy; a high-priced school might keep prices 
high and offer no alternative student funding to offset loan losses. 
Alternatively, it might build its own private loan infrastructure to 
lend directly to students needing more loans. Scholarships and 
grants—need-based or merit-based—can continue to be used to offset 
the cost of education. Ultimately, this proposal strikes a balance 
between preserving short-term stability and the status quo while 
ensuring long-term economic viability of federal student loans.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Federal loans got their start during the space race to improve math 
and science talent pipelines.
127
 In the mid-1960s, loans were 
expanded for the poorest individuals who could not attend college 
without financial assistance.
128
 Congress continued to expand loans in 
 
 126. Trends in College Pricing 2015, COLLEGEBOARD, at 10 (2015), https://trends. 
collegeboard.org/sites/default/files/trends-college-pricing-web-final-508-2.pdf. In the 2015–
2016 school year, for-profit undergraduate tuition averaged $15,610, while equivalent tuition at 
“public two-year in-district” and “public four-year in-state” schools averaged $3,435 and 
$9,410, respectively. Id.  
 127. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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the following decades, leading to loan balances nearly doubling or 
tripling after each expansion,
129
 into the 1990s.
130
  
American students are accumulating more and more loan debt at a 
rapid pace as a result of this expansion. Total national student loan 
debt now stands at over $1.2 trillion.
131
 Student loans are now the 
second largest source of household debt, behind only home 
mortgages.
132
 There is no evidence that this trend of upward costs 
will be reversed.
133
  
The growth in loans has brought with it an increasing percentage 
of debtors in default or behind on payments.
134
 However, section 
523(a)(8) of the United States Bankruptcy Code allows discharge of 
student loans in bankruptcy only if the student can demonstrate an 
undue hardship.
135
 The greatest irritation with undue hardship is that 
it is an undefined term,
136
 creating uncertainty for debtors who 
consequently do not even attempt student loan discharge. Today, four 
different definitions of undue hardship persist in various localities 
around the country: the Johnson test,
137
 the totality of circumstances 
test,
138
 the Brunner test,
139
 and the Bryant poverty test.
140
 The lack of 
a unanimous definition causes wide judicial latitude and inconsistent 
decisions. 
Action must be taken to reform student loans so they continue to 
be a source of economic good and not a woe in our economy. 
Rethinking federal student loans also helps ensure America stays true 
to its core value of equal opportunity education. Loan-based 
 
 129. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text. 
 131. Chopra, supra note 22. 
 132. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 133. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text. 
 134. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text. 
 135. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8); Kratzke, supra note 46 (a heightened standard compared to 
other debts in bankruptcy). See also supra notes 49–57 and accompanying text. 
 136. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 2591 (1978). 
 137. See In re Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1979); supra text 
accompanying note 66. 
 138. See Andrews v. S.D. Student Loan Assistance Corp., 661 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1981); 
supra text accompanying note 67. 
 139. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
 140. In re Johnson, 5 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 532 (applying a three-contingent-part mechanical, 
good faith, and policy test).  
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alternatives include reducing interest rates
141
 and eliminating federal 
student loans. Prior tuition proposals take a variety of forms, 
including complete public funding of public education,
142
 capping 
tuition,
143
 imposing progressive tuition rates,
144
 and creating a public 
school pre-paid model.
145
  
This Note proposes to improve the student debt crisis in America 
by capping loans to a seventy-fifth percentile benchmark. The 
benchmark would not have any allowable growth over time but 
would increase only to keep pace with inflation. This plan would 
allow most schools to operate with relatively minimal impact while 
curbing the most expensive, generally prestigious, highly-endowed 
schools that already are in a better position to provide grants and 
other funding to their students unless they can demonstrate 
“exceptional value.” Ultimately, this would prevent loan borrowing 
from outpacing inflation and encourage schools to reduce costs while 
allowing schools to maintain their autonomy. It is an ideal plan, 
balanced between preserving short-term stability within the status 
quo and ensuring long-term economic viability of federal student 
loans. 
 
 141. See supra note 117. 
 142. See supra note 106. 
 143. See supra note 107. 
 144. See supra note 108. 
 145. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
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